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This contribution builds on research in progress concerned with the so-called 'internal protection alternative' (ipa)1 in international refugee law, presumably one of the most important limits to refugee status under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (hereafter 'the Refugee Convention')2 and especially so in current asylum practice of European and Western States. The ipa is premised on the view that a person whose risk of persecution is limited to one area in the country of origin does not qualify as a refugee if he or she could resettle safely elsewhere in the same country. In this chapter, we discuss the scope for ipa under the law of refugee status. By 'the law' , we mean the 1951 Refugee Convention as amended by the 1967 Protocol and read in accordance with established principles of treaty interpretation. The most important rules in this regard are contained in Articles 31-33 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (vclt).3
Although there is consensus that the ipa cannot be applied if a risk of persecution remains in the area of return, State practice and academic commentary is conflicted about what more is required. In particular, debate centers on the relevant scope of human rights protection in the proposed ipa. Some decisions consider such protection as a neutral factor in the absence of discriminatory denial of rights;4 others examine the applicant's ability to enjoy basic civil, In that case, Baroness Hale noted that 'although the test of reasonableness is a stringent one -whether it would be "unduly harsh" to expect the claimant to return -it is not to be equated with a real risk that the claimant would be subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment so serious as to meet the high threshold set by Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights…internal relocation is a different question.' Para 22. 7 Compare the position taken in Norwegian jurisprudence regarding Serbs from Kosovo, which emphasized the necessity of being registered in order to access basic rights in the proposed ipa, with the practice regarding applicants from Chechnya, in which the obstacles to securing a residence permit elsewhere in the Russian Federation and evidence of discrimination against Chechens do not necessarily preclude ipa application. political, and socio-economic rights.5 A third category acknowledges an elusive 'x factor' over and above the absence of 'serious harm' without defining its substance.6 Even within States, different approaches to human rights may be taken depending on the caseload concerned.7
In this paper, we consider how the ipa concept relates to the refugee definition, and what impact its insecure anchoring in the Refugee Convention has on the resulting analysis. Second, we investigate how other parts of international human rights law (ihrl) inform the ipa criteria. In particular, what risk of human rights violations beyond the original risk of persecution must be considered? Finally, we explore possible gaps between the ipa practice of the European Court of Human Rights and the requirements according to 'what the Law says' under the Refugee Convention. We argue that, under the Refugee Convention, there is a narrow scope for application of the ipa concept where the consequences of return for the individual are balanced against the host State's interest in managing its limited resource base for international protection. A range of subjective and objective factors, including those related to human rights standards, should be considered in such a proportionality analysis.
